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COMMENTS

Discrimination in Jury Selection Via
Peremptory Challenge: Many are Called,

But Few Are Chosen
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1965, a black Alabama man named Robert Swain was on trial
for the crime of rape. During the selection of his jury, the prosecutor
used peremptory challenges to exclude all eight blacks on the jury
venire. Swain was ultimately convicted by an all-white jury.' On appeal,
Swain alleged that the exclusion of blacks in this manner violated
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection guarantees. 2
His case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which ruled that the
use of peremptories to exclude minority group members in a single
case was not prohibited. 3
Eighteen years later, a black Chicagoan, Stanley Payne, stood
in much the same position. He had been convicted of aggravated
battery and armed violence by a jury containing one black member.
In Payne's case, the prosecutor had employed peremptory challenges
to exclude six of seven black venirepersons. Payne also challenged
the practice on appeal but, unlike Swain, alleged a violation of his
sixth amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community." The First District, Third Division of the Illinois Appellate Court accepted Payne's argument and
granted him a new trial, 5 thereby becoming the first court in the United
1. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Alabama actually employed a
"struck jury" system which, in effect, selects a jury by process of elimination. Beginning with a full venire, the parties alternately strike potential jurors until only the
requisite number-twelve in this case-remain. By contrast, peremptory challenges
are exercised immediately after questioning of each individual. Those not challenged
become members of the jury. The process continues until a complete jury has been
empaneled.
2. Id. at 210.
3. Id.
4. People v. Payne, 106 I1. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982).

5. Id.
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States to sidestep the Swain decision purely on sixth amendment
grounds. This apparent breakthrough was short-lived. Late in 1983,
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Payne decision and reaffirmed its adherence to the standard enunciated in Swain.6
The issue presented in these cases, whether exclusion of minority
groups from juries by use of peremptory challenges violates defendants' constitutional rights, has been frequently and vigorously contested in both federal' and state' courts. Illinois has been a particularly
active forum for consideration of the question. 9
This comment will examine the Swain legacy, paying special attention to events in Illinois. It will trace the history of the peremptory challenge and review its role in the trial process. The discussion
will then turn to Swain in detail, followed by a description of postSwain refinements in sixth amendment doctrine which may bear on
the exercise of peremptories. In the next section, state court efforts
to reconcile Swain with these developments will be analyzed. Finally,
this comment will urge reappraisal of the Swain doctrine by the United
States Supreme Court and advocate adoption of an approach now
being employed in a small number of states."0

6. People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983).
7. Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212 (lth Cir. 1983); United States v. Jones,
663 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Nelson,
529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Carter,
528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Neal,
527 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Thompson, 518 F.2d 534 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1137 (1974); United States v. Grant, 471 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Carlton, 456 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207
(5th Cir. 1971).
8. See Brown v. State, 248 Ark. 561, 453 S.W.2d 50 (1970); In re Wells,
20 Cal. App. 3d 640, 98 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971); Allen v. State, 231 Ga. 17, 200 S.E.2d
106 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1159 (1974); State v. Anderson, 315 So. 2d 266
(La. 1975); Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 143, 262 A.2d 792 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Cook, 364 Mass. 767, 308 N.E.2d 508 (1974); People v. Redwine, 50 Mich. App.
593, 213 N.W.2d 841 (1973); State v. Smith, 465 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1971); State v.
Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 262 A.2d 868, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); State v. Noell,
284 N.C. 670, 202 S.E.2d 750 (1970), modified, 428 U.S. 902 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971);
Johnson v. State, 3 Tenn. Crim. App. 17, 456 S.W.2d 864 (1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 997 (1971); Reese v. State, 481 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
9. See People v. Frazier, 127 111. App. 3d 151, 156-57, 469 N.E.2d 594, 598-99
(1st Dist. 1984) (listing 46 cases in which the issue has been raised).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 81-102.
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II.

BACKGROUND: THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS

A comprehensive review of the history and theory of the jury
selection process is beyond the scope of this article," but a brief
description of the procedure, the role of the peremptory challenge
and the constitutional considerations relating to jury selection is in
order.
A.

SELECTION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS

The first step in the jury selection process is compilation of a
list of candidates for jury- service in a given jurisdiction. This list
is commonly known as the jury "wheel".' 2 Typically, the jury wheel
is drawn from lists of registered voters, although voter lists may be
augmented by other sources where appropriate. 3 It is from this pool
that an actual group of potential jurors, the venire, is periodically
selected. Venires are drawn at random from the list of jury
candidates."' Those selected for the venire are then summoned for
actual jury service. They are notified and instructed to report to court
on a given date. At that time, they participate in the process by which
a particular jury is empaneled, a process known as voir dire.
During voir dire, questions are directed to each prospective juror
regarding his or her ability to reach an impartial verdict.' 5 In theory,
11. For a complete treatment, see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURES (1977) [hereinafter cited as J. VAN DYKE]. See also W. JORDAN, JURY
SELECTION (1980); R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980); Note,

Limiting the Peremptory Challenge; Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86
YALE L.J. 1715 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge].
12. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 85.
13. Id. at 85-86. The list of registered voters was made the required source under
the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1968). The Act
restructured the jury selection process for federal courts, replacing the "key-man"
system. Under that method, jury commissioners consulted with prominent civic or
political leaders (the "key men") for recommendations of prospective jurors. Id. at 86.
In recent years, most state court systems have made changes similar to the
federal statute and now randomly select jurors from some standard list. Id. See,
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS, § 600.1310 (1968) (requiring use of voter registration lists);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 1, la (1983) (lists of registered voters and holders of drivers
licenses); CAL. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, § 204.7 (West, 1983) (registered voters, holders
of drivers licenses and holders of state-issued identification cards).
14. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 112. In order to promote the goal
of making juries truly representative, random selection procedures at every stage of
the process are strongly recommended and are utilized in most states. See STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT, (Tentative Draft 1982) [hereinafter

cited

as STANDARDS].

15. There is substantial debate over whether the judge or counsel should con-
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voir dire enables the parties to identify jurors "who may be biased
about the defendant, the prosecution or the case, and who thus might
threaten the jury's impartiality".' 6 Voir dire is considered an integral
part.of the adversarial process and is necessary for the intelligent
exercise of challenges.7
B.

THE ROLE OF CHALLENGES

The questioning during voir dire sets the stage for the parties
to exercise challenges; that is, to request that an individual be excused
from serving on a particular jury.'" The purpose of challenges is to
eliminate jurors who may be biased toward one party or the other.' 9
Potential jurors can be challenged in two ways. Challenges for
cause must be based upon a "narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality." 2 They are generally predicated upon
the prospective juror's personal or business relationship with a party,
victim, witness or attorney in the case, significant prior contact with
the case or involvement in a similar previous incident. 2 '
Unlike challenges for cause, peremptory challenges need not be
based on any specific ground, but rather may be "exercised without
a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
court's control." 2 2 They are considered an essential element in achieving
a fair trial because they enable the parties to eliminate extremes of
partiality.2 3 They may be, and often are, based on pure intuition,
duct voir dire, and practice varies among the states. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note
11, at 282-84.
16. Id. at 139.
17. See STANDARDS, supra note 14, at.68, citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 219 (1965) ("necessary part of [a] trial by jury"); see also Pointer v. United States,

151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) ("one of the most important of the rights secured to the
accused"); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) ("essential to the fairness

of [a] trial by jury").

18. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 145. Some states have enacted statutes which
describe the voir dire process in step-by-step fashion. See MINN. STAT. ANN., Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26.02.
19. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 139.
20. Id.
21. Some states define permissible grounds for cause statutorily, and the range
of specified grounds varies widely. Compare ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 78, § 14 (1983)
(providing only that the fact that a juror has formed an opinion about the case
does not warrant disqualification if he states under oath that he can render an impartial
verdict) with MINN. STAT. ANN., Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26.02, subd.
5 (containing 11 separate grounds for cause, including the existence of obvious partiality or a close family or personal relationship with a party or victim).
22. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
23. Id.at 219.
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or may be used where a party suspects a juror of bias but lacks sufficient proof to warrant a challenge for cause.24 Challenges without
cause, without explanation and without judicial scrutiny are intended
to afford a method of selecting juries which "in fact and in the opinion of the parties are fair and impartial." 2 5
At this point, it is worthwhile to briefly describe the history of
peremptory challenges, if only to illustrate that, the objectives outlined above notwithstanding, the exercise of peremptories-especially
by the prosecution-has not always been permitted.26 The earliest juries
in England were hand picked by the crown, and unacceptable jurors
were summarily removed by means of an unlimited supply of challenges
which were peremptory in nature; no reason need be stated for their
exercise." In 1305, the English Parliament decided that juries hosen
in this manner were not impartial, but rather were biased toward the
prosecution.2 8 In a belief that this situation was repugnant to their
idea of justice, Parliament passed a statute that limited the crown
to challenges for cause certain.2 9 Defendants were still allowed to
challenge peremptorily.3" The statutory ban on prosecutor's peremptories remains the law in England to this day, although the cause
certain requirement has been applied liberally. In practice, the crown
is permitted to request jurors to stand aside without having to state
a reason. This procedure operates to eliminate jurors in much the
same manner as peremptory challenges.31
When America was colonized and early qourts were established,
the 1305 statute was accepted as part of the received common law.3 2
The prosecution's stand aside practice was not so commonly accepted,
however. Some states allowed the practice, while others, most notably
Virginia and New York, denied the prosecution the use of peremp24. See

STANDARDS,

supra note 14, at 84.

25. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212.
26. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 147.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. Id., (citing Statute of Edw. I, Stat. 4 (1305)).
30. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 147. Blackstone considered the peremptory challenge to be clearly a defendant's right-"a provision full of that tenderness
and humanity to prisoners for which our English laws are justly famous." 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353.
31. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 148. The crown will raise challenges for
cause, but offer no explanation. Jurors so challenged are directed to stand aside.
If a panel of 12 can be assembled, those standing aside are dismissed. This procedure
amounts to defacto allowance of peremptories, despite the fact that they have been

explicitly eliminated by statute.
32. Id.
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tory challenges for most of the nineteenth century.3 3 During that period
however, peremptories for the prosecution gradually became the rule
rather than the exception. 4 By the end of the 1800's, statutes authorizing peremptory challenges by the prosecution were in place in many
states, and by the beginning of the twentieth century the government's
right to exercise peremptories was solidly established."
Having highlighted the peremptory's history, the discussion now
turns to its function. In practice, peremptories are used to eliminate
the kinds of jurors the respective parties believe will be unfavorable
to their side.36 These beliefs are often predicated on stereotyped notions
regarding types of jurors and their supposed inclinations toward one
side or the other. Obviously, the defense and the prosecution tend
to look for opposite things in jurors and will exercise their challenges
to try and gain an edge. The decision to challenge is based on outward characteristics which, it is believed, reflect certain inward attitudes and tendencies.' Often, these telling characteristics are an in33. Id. at 148-49, (citing Montague v. Commonwealth, 10 Grat. 767 (C.A. Va.
1853)); People v. Aichison, 7 How. Pr. 241 (N.Y. 1852). Even those states which
allowed prosecution's peremptories limited the number. Typically, the state would
be granted one-half to one-fourth the number the defendant was permitted.
J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 149.
34. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 150. This development is usually traced
to an opinion by the influential Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story in United States
v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480 (1827), in which he asserted that the "'standing aside' procedure has always been part of the law and was still the law". Id. at 149.
35. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 150. The number of challenges permitted
is fixed by statute and the number varies from state to state. In Illinois, in cases
involving a single defendant, both parties are granted 20 peremptory challenges in
capital cases, 10 in cases for which the penalty may be imprisonment in a penitentiary and five in all other cases. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4(e) (1983). For
a breakdown of the limits in other states, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 282-84.
36. Id. at 152. There is a wide variety of literature on the strategy of voir
dire and jury selection. See, e.g., F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS INJURY TRIALS (1949);
A. GUIGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL & CRIMINAL TRIALS 2d (1984); W. JORDAN, JURY
SELECTION (1980). See also Israelson, Selecting the Jury-Plaintiff s View, 5 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 143 (1966); Wildman, Selecting the Jury-Defense View, 5 AM. JUR.
TRIALS

247 (1966).

37. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 152. Van Dyke provides an insight into
the aims of one prosecutor's office. He reprints an excerpt from a prosecutor's training
manual prepared by an assistant district attorney in Dallas. The excerpt includes the
following:
III. What to look for in a juror.
A. Attitudes
1.You are not looking for a fair juror, but rather a strong, biased and
sometimes hypocritical individual who believes that Defendants are different
from them in kind, rather than degree.
2. You are not looking for any member of a minority group which
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dividual's most readily discernible attributes-his or her age, sex, oc38
cupation, general appearance or race.
C.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE JURY SELECTION
PROCESS

It is well settled that exclusion of minority groups from participation in the overall jury process violates the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court has reversed numerous convictions of minority
defendants on the ground that the method by which candidates for
jury service were identified failed to ensure adequate representation
of minorities. 39 The Court has stated, "For racial discrimination to

result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups

not only violates our Constitution . ..but is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government."" 0

It is important to note that the principles stated above apply to

the process by which potential jurors are identified and selected. The
decisions support the rule that the state may not employ practices
which tend to exclude minorities from the pool of persons from which

juries are selected. When faced with the question of whether the state
could employ practices (prosecution's peremptories) which directly and
purposefully excluded minorities from particularjuries, the Court came

to quite a different conclusion.
III.

SWAIN V. ALABAMA-"SYSTEMATIC

EXCLUSION"

The question came before the Court in a 1965 case, Swain v.
Alabama."' Swain, a black man, had been convicted of rape and

Id.

may subject him to oppression-they almost always empathize with the
accused.
3. You are not looking for free thinkers and flower children .. .
4. Women
a. I don't like women jurors because I don't trust them.
38. Id.

39. See, e.g., Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1941) (jury commissioners must make
affirmative efforts to identify qualified blacks); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940)
(fact that only 18 blacks were named out of 512 persons summoned for grand jury
service could not have been "chance or accident alone"); Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587 (1935) (fact that no black had ever served on a jury in a particular county
created a prima facie showing of unlawful discrimination); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S.
442 (1900) (state administrative officer excluded blacks from jury lists); Exparte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (state judge excluded blacks from jury lists); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (state statute qualified only whites for jury duty).
40. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
41. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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sentenced to death. On appeal, he contended that the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges to strike all six black venirepersons not
otherwise excluded, resulting in his conviction by an all-white jury,
amounted to a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment.4 In considering this claim, the Court recited the history
and function of the peremptory challenge 3 and, while acknowledging that peremptories were not required by the Constitution,"" stated
that they had come to be regarded as "one of the most important
of the rights secured to the accused."" 5 The Court concluded its discussion of the issue by saying:
In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the
function it serves ... we cannot hold that the Constitution requires
an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his
challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular case
must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain
a fair and impartial jury. .... "
Swain's challenge to the system was not limited to the use of
peremptories in his individual case. He also argued a broader claim.
He alleged that not only were blacks removed in this case, but that
no black had ever served on any petit jury, civil or criminal, in the
county, and that prosecutors had systematically used peremptories to
that effect. ' The Court conceded that if such a showing could be
made, the presumption favoring the prosecutor might be overcome.
The Court determined that in order to establish a denial of equal
protection, a defendant would have to show "systematic exclusion"
of group members in "case after case" over a period of time. The
Court held that the record in the case fell short of the required
demonstration."8
42. Id. at 205.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 18-38. The Court discussed several other
justifications for the use of peremptory challenges. According to the Court, peremptories allow counsel to engage in probing voir dire without fear of "incurring a juror's
hostility." Also, challenges allow counsel to judge persons "not as individuals ...
but in light of the limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may include their
group affiliations ... ."

Finally, the Court acknowledged that historically the

prosecution has been granted fewer peremptories than the defendant, but stated that
the dominant view in this country has been to award each side the same number.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-21.
44. Id. at 219 (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
45. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396,
408 (1893)).
46. Swain, 380 U.S. at 222.

47. Id. at 223.
48. Id.at 227. The following language is considered the enunciation of the
Swain "test":
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The Swain approach to the constitutionality of the exercise of

peremptories to eliminate members of certain groups has become law
in most jurisdictions. 9 Nevertheless, the decision is not without its
critics. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Warren and Douglas, wrote

a dissenting opinion.5" Over the years, Swain has been criticized by
several state courts5 and numerous commentators. 2 Also, the public

when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim
may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected
as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived
challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit
juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added significance.
Id. at 223.
The Court stated that Swain failed to meet this requirement, in that he failed
to show "when, how often, and under what circumstances the prosecutor alone has
been responsible for striking those Negroes who have appeared on petit jury panels
in Talledega County." Id. at 224. It is unclear from the record what evidence Swain
offered. Apparently, testimony was heard from several defense attorneys who had
tried criminal cases in the jurisdiction. The Court conceded that "there has not been
a Negro on a jury in Talladega County since about 1950", but stated that the responsibility of the prosecutor for this state of affairs was not."illuminated" by the record.
Id. at 226. The record did include population statistics Which indicated that of those
in the county eligible for jury service, 26% were black, and that blacks had comprised
10-15% of the membership of jury venires between 1953 and the date of Swain's
trial. Id. at 205.
49. See cases cited supra notes 8-9.
50. The dissenters would have applied the so-called "rule of exclusion" to determine whether a prima facie case of denial of equal protection had been made. The
rule of exclusion had become the standard means of establishing discrimination in
cases in which minorities were allegedly excluded from overall jury service. The
dissenters believed the rule was equally applicable at the jury level.
Under the rule of exclusion,
proof that Negroes constituted a substantial segment of the population of
the jurisdiction, that some Negroes were qualified to serve as jurors, and
that none had been called for jury service over an extended period of time
was held to constitute prima facie proof of the systematic exclusion of
Negroes from jury service.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 232 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475, 480 (1954)).
51. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 258
(1978); People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1046 (1983) (Simon, J., dissenting);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980); Commonwealth
v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 336 A.2d 290 (1975) (Nix, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro
Defendant and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. REV. 448 (1966); Note, The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REV., 103, 135-39 (1965); Note, Peremptory
Challenge-SystematicExclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss.
L.J. 159 (1967); Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle
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media have condemned the practice which Swain is believed to
perpetuate. 3 Those who take issue with Swain do so on several
grounds. They argue that every defendant is entitled to equal protection, yet Swain requires that several must suffer discrimination via
the use of peremptories before any can successfully object." Moreover,
the Swain burden of proof has proven nearly insurmountable since
few, if any, jurisdictions maintain records of the race of prospective
jurors as a group, much less detailed breakdowns of the characteristics
of those who happen to be challenged. As a result, defendants seeking to meet the "case after case" standard have almost universally

failed." Also, Swain's heavy burden allows the judicial process to
be tainted with the appearance of discrimination at the very least.
In other areas of the law, conduct which created such a strong inference of discrimination would not be tolerated." Finally, and perhaps
Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 662 (1974); Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite
Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause,
46 U. CN. L. REv. 554 (1977); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional
Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966);
Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1965); Note, Limiting the
Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715
(1977).

53. See People v. Frazier, 127 I11.
App. 3d 151, 158-62, 469 N.E.2d 594, 600-02
(1st Dist. 1984) (citing Editorial, Trial by (White) Jury, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1983,
at 22E); Tybor, Justice in black and white, Chicago Tribune, May 22, 1983, sec.
19, at 1; Editorial, The Chiefjustice's challenge, Chicago Tribune, April 29, 1983,
sec. 1, at 20; Editorial, Peremptory injustice, Chicago Sun-Times, April 25, 1983,
at 27; Editorial Racism in courtrooms, Chicago Defender, December 9, 1982, at 13;
Editorial, Landmark decision, Chicago Defender, June 1, 1982, at 9.
The Chicago Tribune recently conducted a study of the use of peremptories
in the Cook County, Illinois Circuit Court system. Reporters monitored jury selection for 31 criminal felony trials during July, 1984. According to the Tribune study,
prosecutors exercised a total of 213 peremptory challenges in those cases. One hundred
forty-five, or 68016 of those challenges were exercised against blacks, even though
blacks comprised only 29076 of the potential jurors. See Frantz, Many blacks kept
off juries here Chicago Tribune, August 5, 1984, sec. 1, at 1.
54. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 336 A.2d 290, 295 (1975) (Nix,
J., dissenting) ("is justice to sit supinely by and be flaunted in case after case before

a remedy is available?").
55. See Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3d 56-73 (1977) (collecting federal and state cases).
See also Payne, 99 I11.
2d at 147, 457 N.E.2d at 1208 (Simon, J., dissenting). Judge
Simon states that he has found only two cases since Swain where defendants succeeded
in establishing systematic exclusion; State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) and
State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979). In both cases, several attorneys
testified that they had tried cases against the prosecutor in question, and that he
repeatedly used peremptories to exclude blacks. Further research indicates that Brown
and Washington remain the only two such cases to date.
56. The "rule of exclusion" urged by the dissenters but rejected by the majority
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most fundamentally, it is argued that adherence to Swain amounts
to a myopic refusal to recognize and remedy a practice which has
been characterized as "invidious", "blatant" and an "open secret"."
IV.

POST-SWAIN DEVELOPMENTS: THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT "REPRESENTATIVE CROSS
SECTION" REQUIREMENT

The constitutional claim in Swain was based on an alleged denial
8 The years
of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment.
following the Swain decision saw the development of the principle
that the sixth amendment encompasses a right to be tried by a jury
drawn from a representative cross section of the community.
The first noteworthy decision in this regard was Duncan v.
Louisiana," decided in 1968, three years after Swain. Duncan held
that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial was applicable to the
states via the fourteenth amendment.6
Seven years later, the Court considered the nature and scope of
that right in Taylor v. Louisiana.6' In Taylor, the Court ruled that
a state statute exempting women from jury service unless they affirmatively chose to serve was unconstitutional because the systematic
exclusion of women from panels from which juries are drawn violated
the sixth amendment. The right to be tried by an "impartial" jury
includes a requirement that the jury be drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 61 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
in Swain, has been applied in a variety of contexts. For instance, a plaintiff seeking
to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act need only establish that: 1) he or she belongs to a racial minority;
2) that he or she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; 3) that, despite his or her qualifications he or she was rejected;
and 4) that, after the rejection, the position remained open. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1
to e-17 (1982). See also, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972).
A similar approach has been employed in the areas of housing discrimination. See
Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1979) (construing the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1976)).
57. See People v. Gilliard, 112 Ill. App. 3d 799, 445 N.E.2d 1293 (1983). "It
is an open secret that prosecutors in Chicago and elsewhere have using [sic] their
peremptory challenges to remove all Blacks, or all but token Blacks, from juries
in criminal cases where the defendants are Black." Id. at 807, 445 N.E.2d at 1299.
See also Waltz, Now Its Hardfor Lawyers to Pick Bias Jury, Chicago Sun-Times,
July 13, 1982, at 30, col. 1.
58. Swain, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
59. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
60. Id.at 150.
61. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
62. Id.at 537.
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6 3 where a challenge to a similar statute
distinguished Hoyt v. Florida,
on the basis of the fourteenth amendment had been rejected. The
Taylor court stated:

It is true that Hoyt . .. held that such systems did not deny
due process of law or equal protection of the laws because there
was a sufficiently rational basis for such an exemption. But Hoyt
did not involve a defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community and the prospect of
depriving him of that right if women as a class are systematically
excluded. The right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely
6
rational grounds. There must be weightier reasons ...
In other words, Taylor suggests that when practices which exclude certain groups from jury service are challenged as violations
of general due process and equal protection, the state need only show
a minimally rational connection between the practice in question and
some state interest. If, on the other hand, the practice in question and
implicate a specific Bill of Rights guarantee (i.e. the right to an impartial jury), it will be subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny, one
which requires the state to identify a more important interest.
The constitutional attack in Swain, like that in Hoyt, was founded
on fourteenth amendment equal protection grounds. Given Taylor,
it is reasonable to question whether the application of a sixth
amendment-based analysis to the use of peremptories might lead to
a different result. It is doubtful that the state's general fondness for
unrestrained challenges would be sufficiently "weighty" to justify direct
interference with the defendant's right to an impartial jury. This is
not to suggest that the sixth amendment compels the outright elimination of prosecutors' peremptories, but it does seem to call for a
heightened degree of sensitivity on the part of the courts for the potential abuse of peremptory challenges. At the very least Swain's "case
after case" threshold of impermissibility seems inappropriate in light
of the sixth amendment.
Before rushing to such a conclusion however, it must be noted
that Taylor, like its fourteenth amendment counterparts, dealt with
the composition of "jury wheels, pools of names, panels or venires
from which juries are drawn." 6 Taylor explicitly states that it imposes "no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror
the community . . . [d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any
63. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).

64. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 533-34.
65. Id. at 538.
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particular composition." 6 6 Nonetheless, commentators have observed

that the harm identified in Taylor, namely the threat to impartiality
which results from exclusion of certain sets of community attitudes,
compels the extension of Taylor's reasoning beyond the venire to the
jury level, for it is on actual juries, not jury venires, where the desired
interaction of Taylor's cross section of community attitudes and values

actually occurs. 67
V.
A.

ANALYSIS: RECONCILING SWAIN AND TAYLOR

THE CALIFORNIA "STATE CONSTITUTION" SOLUTION

In the belief that Swain offered inadequate protection in light
of the sixth amendment, several state courts have seized upon the
Taylor rationale and interpreted their own state constitutions in a manner which circumvents the "case after case" requirement.68 The
Supreme Court of California became the first state court to lighten

the burden of a defendant seeking to object to the use of peremptory
challenges. In People v. Wheeler,69 two black defendants had been
convicted of murder by an all-white jury, after the prosecutor used
peremptories to excuse all blacks on the venire. On appeal, the court

considered whether such circumstances amounted to a denial of the
right to trial by an impartial jury.71

66. Id.
67. See Limiting the Peremptory Challenge, supra note 11. This argument runs
as follows: A representative cross section requirement is concerned with a substantive definition of jury impartiality. If a jury is to truly represent the conscience of
the community, it should include a widespread set of community attitudes and biases.
While individual, situation-specific biases may be eliminated, interplay between general,
group biases is desirable as a means of making the jury, as a deliberative body,
genuinely impartial. Therefore, the Taylor safeguards are only illusory if limited to
jury venires, for it is in the jury itself that this interplay actually takes place. It
will never occur, and thus juries will never be truly impartial, if members of certain
groups are ostensibly considered for juries, but are never actually selected. But see,
Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to ProsecutorialMisuse of the Peremptory
Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770 (1979) (arguing that "fair cross section" considerations are inapplicable at the jury level).
68. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 881, (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980).
69. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
70. Id. at 263-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94, 583 P.2d at 752-53. The record is
unclear as to the number of blacks who were struck. As is the case in most state
courts, the race of prospective jurors is not made a matter of record. After the prosecutor had exercised several challenges, defense counsel began asking prospective
jurors to state their race for purposes of preserving the point for review.
71. Id.
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In its analysis the court discussed the line of United States
Supreme Court cases on the representative cross section requirement,
a line which concluded with the Taylor decision.72 The court went
on to consider the applicability of California law to the issue and
declared that the cross section requirement is guaranteed equally and
independently by article 1, section 16 of the California Constitution.73
Having established that it was basing its decision on state grounds,
the court set out to define the contours of this right vis-a-vis the use
of peremptory challenges. Here, the court drew an imporant distinction, saying, "It is true that the statute (permitting peremptories)
defines such a challenge as one for which 'no reason need be given';
but it does not follow therefrom that it is an objection for which
no reason need exist."" In practice, every challenge has some basis,
72. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
73. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 265, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895. Article
I, section 16 provides that "[t]rial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured
to all." This provision has been held to encompass the right to an impartialjury.
See, e.g., People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1958).
74. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901, citing
CAL. PEN. CODE, § 1069. The court argued that, given the limited number of peremptories available, a party will not remove a prospective juror for "frivolous" reasons
or for literally no reason at all. In practice, a party will remove a juror whom he
suspects of conscious or unconscious bias. In some cases, evidence of such bias will
be tangible and virtually certain. For example, a juror may have an arrest record,
he may have previously complained of police harassment or his appearance may suggest an unconventional lifestyle. At the other extreme, a suspicion of bias may be
based on a high degree of speculation. Either party may feel an intuitive mistrust
of a juror's objectivity, merely due to an inexplicable "first impression". Upon entering the box, a juror may have smiled-or glared-at the defendant. Responsive to
this reality, the law allows removal of such jurors by means of a challenge for which
no reason "need be given", but reasons for such challenges certainly exist.
Furthermore, all the possible motivations discussed above share a common
element: they seek to eliminate a specific bias-a bias related to the particularcase
or parties. In that sense, they are neutral with respect to the groups on the venire.
As the court puts it, "both blacks and whites may have prior arrest, both rich and
poor may have been crime victims, both young and old may have relatives on the
police force, both men and women may believe strongly in law and order, and
members of any group whatever may alienate a party by 'bare looks and gestures."'
Id. at 275, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. It follows that peremptory challenges
based on these specific biases do not undermine the jury's representativeness. By
contrast, when a party exercises peremptories based on association with an identifiable
racial, religious or ethnic group-what might be termed "group bias"-the primary
purpose of the representative cross section requirement is frustrated. That purpose
is to promote the interaction of the diverse beliefs and values that jurors bring from
their group experiences. If jurors are struck simply because they may hold these
very beliefs, such interaction becomes impossible and the jury will be dominated
by the "group biases" of the majority.
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and some grounds for challenges may be constitutionally impermissible. The court concluded that the use of peremptories on the sole
75
ground of group bias violates the California Constitution.
Up to this point, the Wheeler court had departed very little from
the holding in Swain. The difficult question remained: at what point
does the inference that group bias is the sole ground for removal
become strong enough to rebut the presumption that the prosecution's
motives are constitutionally permissible? Swain, of course, required
the "case after case" showing. The Wheeler court eased the burden
considerably by imposing a three pronged requirement upon a defendant seeking to make a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.
First, he must make as complete a record of the circumstances as
is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons excluded are
members of a cognizable group within the contemplation of the
representative cross section rule. Third, from all the circumstances
of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are
being excluded because of their group association rather than because
of any specific bias. 7" In the face of such a showing, the court must
determine whether a reasonable inference arises that group bias is the
sole ground on which peremptories are being exercised. If the court
finds that such a prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts
to the prosecution to show that the challenges in question were not
based on group bias alone.7"
The advantages of the Wheeler test, at least from the point of
view of the defendant, are obvious. The burden upon him is eased
in two distinct respects. First, the sheer weight of evidence required
to rebut the presumption of permissibility is lessened, in that the prosecution's conduct in only one case, the case at hand, might be sufficient. The "case after case" requirement is therefore quantitatively
reduced. Second, the necessary evidence is more accessible to the defen75. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
76. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The court mentioned
certain types of evidence which might be relevant, including a showing that an
opponent has struck most or all of the members of a certain group, or has used
a disproportionate number of peremptories against that group, or that struck jurors'
only common characteristic is group membership, or that such prospective jurors
were questioned only perfunctorily, if at all, during voir dire. The court also stated
that the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to allege
a violation.
77. Id. The court states that it will rely upon the "good judgment of the trial
courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses
belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination." Id. at 280,
583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
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dant. It is entirely within his power to record and preserve the racial

composition of the venire and jury. He is no longer called upon to
produce similar records from previous cases, records which are not

routinely kept.
The Wheeler approach goes a long way in protecting the rights
of defendants. Apparently, most courts feel that Wheeler goes too

far in that direction, for the "reasonable inference" test has been
adopted by only a small number of other jurisdictions."8

A case from one such jurisdiction merits some discussion. In

People v. Thompson, the Second Department of the New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, accepted the sixth amendment

argument and declared that it was not compelled to adhere to Swain."9
The court chose to adopt the Wheeler approach "in essence", but

made some subtle modifications in its treatment of a defendant's re-

quired showing." According to Wheeler, a defendant could base an
objection to the use of peremptory challenges upon, inter alia, the

mere fact that the prosecution used a disproportionate number of
challenges to exclude minorities.' On this point, the Thompson court

parts company with Wheeler. In analyzing whether challenges have

been abused, Thompson calls for "even greater deference than usual"
to the initial determination of the trial court. 2 Under Thompson,

statistical disproportionality will generally be insufficient to support
a claim of unlawful discrimination, for "it may well be that the prosecutor's challenges were properly exercised but for reasons that are

not as readily apparent to those of us who were not in the position

of the Judge who attended the voir dire." 83 Thompson strives to deal
with the reality that peremptories are often motivated by jurors'

idiosyncrasies which do not appear on a cold record. In allowing for

78. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 881 (1978); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 612, 612 P.2d 716 (1980) (The Crespin
court expressed its adoption of the Wheeler approach, but held that the record in
the case was insufficient to raise an inference of improper use of peremptories.). The
vast majority of courts have rejected Wheeler. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 225 Kan.
410, 591 P.2d 166, 172 (1979); Lawrence v. State, 295 Md. 557, 457 A.2d 1127 (1983);
State v. Sims, 639 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Commonwealth v. Henderson,
497 Pa. 23, 438 A.2d 951, 955 (1981); State v. Ucero, 450 A.2d 809 (1982); State
v. Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1, 286 N.W.2d 607 (1979).
79. 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981). Thompson appears to have been
overruled sub silentio by the New York Court of Appeals decision in People v.
McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982).
80. Id. at __ , 435 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
81. See supra note 76.
82. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d at __ , 435 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
83. Id.
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this fact, Thompson seeks to provide slightly greater latitude to the
prosecution. The determination of the trial judge, who is in a position to observe jurors' "bare looks and gestures" and rule accordingly, will seldsom be disturbed on appeal.
Aside from the cases discussed above, most state courts have continued to follow the Swain approach. It is also noteworthy that, with
one exception, the few states which have embraced a Wheeler approach
have likewise based their decisions on their own state constitutions.8 4
The "exception" referred to above went even beyond Wheeler, in
that it did not place its decision on a state constitution foundation.
In 1982, an Illinois appellate court renounced the Swain approach

purely on sixth amendment-Taylor grounds.8
B. THE SWAIN LEGACY IN ILLINOIS

In Illinois, the systematic exclusion issue was first confronted in
a decision which predates Swain. In 1959, in People v. Harris,8" the
Illinois Supreme Court disposed of the issue somewhat summarily.
Devoting a total of one paragraph to the question, the court stated,

"the right of the peremptory challenge is a substantial one which
should not be abridged or denied."" 7 The court's terse treatment of
the issue seems incomplete, and begs a rather large question: on what

basis does the court identify a "right" to peremptory challenges-a
right neither explicitly nor implicitly recognized in either the United
States or Illinois Constitutions-and, in language which evokes the
first amendment, elevate that "right" to the level of inviolability?
In support of this proposition, the court cited a decision of another

state court and a legal encyclopedia. 88 Despite these tenuous underpinnings, the Harris decision was followed in a later case.

9

Not

surprisingly, an unbroken string of decisions followed in the wake
of Swain, which was viewed as an affirmation of the Harris doctrine.9"

84. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1978); Crespin, 94 N.M. 612, 612
P.2d 716 (1980).
85. Payne, 106 Il1.
App. 3d 1034, 463 N.E.2d 1046 (1982).
2d 446, 161 N.E.2d 809 (1959).
86. 17 Ill.
87. Id.at 451, 161 N.E.2d at 811.
88. Id.at 811-12, (citing People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N.W.2d
466, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 749 (1944)); 50 C.J.S. 1068, Juries, § 280 (1947).
89. People v. Dukes, 19 Ill. 2d 532, 169 N.E.2d 64 (1960).
2d 291, 296 N.E.2d 731 (1973); People
90. See, e.g., People v. King, 54 I11.
App. 3d
v. Butler, 46 I11.
2d 162, 263 N.E.2d 89 (1970); People v. Dixon, 105 I11.
App. 3d 10, 433 N.E.2d 1119
340, 434 N.E.2d 369 (1982); People v. Belton, 105 I11.
2d 342, 430 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); People v. Mims,
(1982); People v. Gaines, 88 I11.
103 Ill. App. 3d 673, 431 N.E.2d 1126 (1981); People v. Lavinder, 102 Ill. App.
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Against this backdrop, the First District, Third Division of the
Illinois Appellate Court heard the appeal of Stanley Payne. Payne
had been convicted of aggravated battery and armed violence by a
jury which contained one black member. Six other black venirepersons
had been peremptorily challenged by the prosecution. 9 ' Unlike the
numerous Illinois defendants who had objected to the practice on fourteenth amendment grounds, Payne asserted a violation of the sixth
amendment.9" This subtle distinction was pivotal to the court, which
stated:
We believe Duncan and Taylor together have significantly
changed the law from the time Swain was decided vis-a-vis the sixth
amendment right ... to a jury drawn from a representative cross
section of the community .... At the time Swain was decided, the
sixth amendment had not yet been recognized as applicable to State

criminal trials, and the accused's sixth amendment right to a jury
drawn from a fair cross section of the community and the prohibition of the State's affirmative frustration of that right were neither
raised nor discussed in Swain. ... We therefore apply Taylor and
its rationale to this case rather than Swain, and we conclude that
the sixth amendment precludes the State, i.e., the prosecuting
attorney, from affirmatively frustrating the right of the accused...
by utilizing peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury
solely because they are blacks. 93

By invoking Taylor, the court was able to comfortably disregard
a seemingly overwhelming amount of Illinois precedent. In all prior

decisions, relief had been denied either on the basis of Swain-Harris
or because of an inadequate record.94 Here, Swain, having been limited

to fourteenth amendment claims, was not controlling. Further, the

court was willing to adopt a Wheeler-like, single case, "reasonable
inference" test for evaluating sixth amendment claims, so the record

from Payne's case alone was sufficient. Thus unfettered, the court
went on to reverse Payne's conviction on the ground that the totality
of the circumstances created a "reasonable appearance" that the pro-

secution was attempting to frustrate Payne's right to an impartial jury
3d 662, 430 N.E.2d 243 (1981); People v. Clearlee, 101 I11.App. 3d 16, 427 N.E.2d
1005 (1981); People v. Tucker, 99 I1. App. 3d 606, 425 N.E.2d 511 (1981); People
v. Bracey, 93 111. App. 3d 864, 417 N.E.2d 1029 (1981); People v. Smith, 91 111.
App. 3d 523, 414 N.E.2d 1117 (1980); People v. Attaway, 41 111. App. 3d 837, 354
N.E.2d 448 (1976); People v. Fort, 133 Ill. App. 3d 473, 273 N.E.2d 439 (1971).
91. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 436 N.E.2d at 1047.

92. Id.

93. Id. at 1042-43, 436 N.E.2d at 1051.

94. See supra notes 88-89.
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by excluding blacks solely because they were black. 9 5 Under the TaylorWheeler approach being adopted, such a reasonable appearance was
sufficient to warrant reversal and a new trial.
The Payne ruling was quickly followed in two subsequent decisions of the same court. 96 Other Illinois appellate courts rejected Payne,
however, choosing instead to continue their adherence to
Swain-Harris.97 It was left to the Illinois Supreme Court to settle the
issue. In People v. Davis98 the court rejectedothe sixth amendment
argument and expressed its belief in the continuing vitality of Swain.
Davis did not explicitly discuss the implications of Taylor or Payne.
The matter was given more detailed attention in People v. Williams.9
Therein, the court stated its opinion that Taylor was not intended
to apply to actual juries, that "the authority of Swain was not
lessened" 1 0 by the Taylor decision and that Payne "does not satisfactorily meet the questions which must be addressed in considering the
problem." 1 0 ' It came as no surprise when the Illinois Supreme Court
administered the coup de grdce-Payneitself was reversed in December,
1983.102

95. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1045, 436 N.E.2d at 1053.
96. People v. Gilliard, 112 I1. App. 3d 799, 445 N.E.2d 1293 (1983); People
v. Gosberry, 109 Ill. App. 3d 674, 440 N.E.2d 954 (1982).
97. See, e.g., People v. Osborn, Il Ill. App. 3d 1043, 444 N.E.2d 1158 (1983)
(Third District); People v. Newsome, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 443 N.E.2d 634 (1982)
(First District, Second Division); People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d
1066 (1982) (First District, First Division).
98. 95 I11.2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353 (1983).
99. 97 Ill. 2d 252, 454 N.E.2d 220 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2364 (1984).
In Williams, 28 of the prospective jurors examined and excused were black. Fifteen
of those were challenged for cause by the state and two were removed for cause
by the defendant. The other 11 blacks were peremptorily challenged by the state.
The defendant introduced evidence regarding the racial composition of juries
in 43 recent capital cases in Illinois. In over half of those cases, the juries were
all white, while most of the rest contained only one black. No evidence was offered
to illustrate the extent to which the state's use of peremptories contributed to the
composition of those juries. For that reason, the court ruled that systematic exclusion had not been established.
100. Id. at 278, 454 N.E.2d at 231-32.
101. Id. at 275-78. 454 N.E.2d at 231-32. The court's analysis largely consisted
of a lengthy, verbatim recitation of Swain's discussion of the importance of peremptory challenges. Its refusal to adopt the Wheeler approach was based on a belief
that the usefulness of peremptories would be undermined. The court also observed
that Wheeler has "found surprisingly little support." Id. at 280, 454 N.E.2d at 233.
102. People v. Payne, 99 IIl. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983). Judge Simon
dissented in Payne, writing that he would accept the appellate court's interpretation
of Taylor. He further argued that:
the majority's extensive reliance on the function of the peremptory challenge
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Those who might have thought the Payne reversal would put the
issue to rest were quickly proven wrong. Within eight months the
very same appellate court which had originally overturned Payne's
conviction-only to be overturned itself-had more to say on
10 3
the subject. The exclusion issue arose yet again in People v. Frazier.
The First District, Third Division opened its opinion by conceding
that Swain remained the law throughout Illinois. Undaunted by that
fact, the court restated its view that systematic exclusion remained
a serious problem and lamented the fact that the legislature had not
taken steps to remedy it.""0 The court felt compelled to fashion its
own remedy, within the constraints imposed by Swain and its Illinois
progeny. To that end, the Frazier court established several new rules
and record-keeping requirements, intended to "make it possible for
defendants to track the appellate cases where it is alleged that prosecutors are systematically excluding blacks. ..,"I" Pursuant to Frazier,

future cases in which the exclusion issue is raised must be disposed
of by published opinion

rather than by unpublished order.1 1 6

Furthermore, the names of the prosecutors are to be included in such
opinions,' 7 so that individual patterns of discriminatory practices might
be more easily demonstrated.
It remains to be seen whether Frazier's remedial measures will
have much of an impact on the exclusion problem. Although the
Frazier mandate will help alleviate a portion of the defendant's evidentiary burden, the far more important requirement, statistics on the
racial characteristics of jurors chosen or challenged, is still not readily

is misplaced. . . .The Supreme Court has held that peremptory challenges
are not required by the Constitution (see, e.g., Stillson v. United States,
250 U.S. 583 (1919)) and a State could presumably eliminate such challenges
altogether. Peremptory challenges may often have a useful and legitimate
purpose, but they are entitled to no more deference in constitutional analysis
than any other device used by State officials to exclude persons from jury
service ...Just as unconstitutional discharges of State employees cannot
be excused by referring to the general rule that employers have the right
to hire and fire as they please, (citation omitted) so racial discrimination
in the voir dire cannot be condoned by simply pointing to the word 'peremptory' and asserting that it means what it says.
Id. at 143-44, 457 N.E.2d at 1206.
103. 127 I11.
App. 3d 151, 469 N.E.2d 594 (1st Dist. 1984).
104. Id. at 155, 469 N.E.2d at 597. The opinion cited a recent report presented
to the Illinois General Assembly by the Chief Justice. The report discussed the
systematic exclusion issue and urged legislative action.
105. Id. at 155, 469 N.E.2d at 597.
106. An "unpublished order" contains only the name of the case and its ultimate
disposition, i.e. reversed, affirmed, etc.
107. Frazier, 127 I11.
App. 3d at 155, 469 N.E.2d at 597.
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available. ,08 It is more likely that if meaningful changes are to occur,
they will be initiated by the legislatures or the United States Supreme
Court. However, recent events indicate that neither body is particularly
eager to take on the task.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE:

LEGISLATIVE ACTION OR JUDICIAL REAPPRAISAL?

A.

RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

The systematic exclusion debate, typified by the brief description
of events in Illinois, has largely been contested in state and lower
federal courts. The battle may soon be moving to a higher front.
In 1983, defendants in three consolidated cases sought a writ of
certiorari in order to bring the systematic exclusion issue before the
Supreme Court once again.109 The petitions were denied, with Justices
Marshall and Brennan dissenting.' 0 In an unusual development, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, wrote a brief opinion
respecting the denial of certiorari.' Justice Stevens stated that his
vote to deny should not be interpreted as disagreement with the
dissenters on the importance of the question presented. Rather, Stevens
would have the state courts further consider the procedural and
substantive ramifications of the problem, leaving the Supreme Court
to deal with the issue "more wisely" at a later date." 2 Apparently,
Stevens envisions the state courts experimenting with alternative
approaches to the issue, along the lines of the Wheeler decision in
California.
Thus far, only a small number of courts have taken up Stevens'
challenge. Ironically, the first such instance occurred when one of
the very defendants whose certiorari petition was denied sought habeas
corpus relief. In McCray v. Abrams a federal district court interpreted
Stevens' words as an invitation for the federal courts to enter the
fray and reconsider Swain." 3 The McCray court accepted the invita108. Bernalillo County Court in Albuquerque, New Mexico is one court that
maintains a record of the characteristics of jurors chosen and challenged. Statistics
from that jurisdiction indicate that between the years 1972 and 1974, prosecutors
tended to remove younger or non-white jurors, while the defense tried to remove
the older and more established jurors. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 157-59.
109. McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 2441.
Id. at 2436.
Id.
576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The court stated that:

It is unusual, to say the least, for a district court to reexamine a Supreme
Court case squarely on point . . . surely there is some invitation implicit
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tion and noted that Swain's rationale had been "diluted" by Duncan

and Taylor. The court also acknowledged Taylor's caveat that parties
"are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition", but refused to interpret that statement as permission for the use of peremptory

challenges for the sole purpose of automatic exclusion of blacks from
juries."" Based on these considerations, the court concluded that the
rule of Swain should be modified in favor of a Wheeler analysis.
Under such an approach, McCray's habeas corpus petition was
granted."
Among the state courts, only Florida has acted upon Stevens'
suggestion. In State v. Neil"'6 the Florida Supreme Court held that

the Florida state constitution prohibits the exercise of peremptory
challenges solely on the basis of group affiliation." 7 The Neil court

was unwilling to wholly embrace any prior approach to the problem,
however. They instead devised a Wheeler-Thompson hybrid. Neil
embraced Thompson's posture of extreme deference to the trial court's
initial determination and, like Thompson, limited its decision to
challenges based on race. The Florida court read Wheeler as purporting

in Justice Stevens' opinion for the lower courts to engage in such reconsideration, and that invitation was not restricted to the state courts, as is
evidenced by the opinion's reference to the absence of a 'conflict of decision within the federal system' as a reason for postponing the Supreme
Court's consideration of the issue.
Id. at 1246.
114. Id. at 1248.
115. McCray was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Just
as this article was going to press, that court issued its decision. The court affirmed
the district court determination that McCray had established a prima facie case of
unlawful discrimination, but also ruled that the state should be afforded an opportunity to rebut. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
The court based its decision on the "fundamental value judgments" underlying
the sixth amendment. It disagreed with those decisions which determined that the
representative cross-section requirement had no implications for the process of selecting actual juries. The court reasoned as follows:
No defendant has ever been tried before a venire; the venire is not the body
that deliberates in the jury room; no defendant has ever been found guilty
by a venire. If there is a Sixth Amendment requirement that the venire represent a fair cross section of the community, it must logically be because
it is important that the defendant have the chance that the petit jury will
be similarly constituted. The necessary implication is that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant that possibility. It guarantees not that the
possibility will ripen into actuality, but only the fair and undistorted chance
that it will.
Id. at 1128-29.
116. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
117. Id. at 487.
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to apply to any discrete minority group-based on sex, age or
' However, the
ethnicity-and declined to extend its ruling that far.
Neil court interpreted Thompson as applying only to the prosecution,
while Wheeler suggested that the ability to object to the use of
challenges should be given to both parties. In that respect, Neil chose
to follow Wheeler." 9 The result is yet another approach to the issue,
which differs in subtle, but crucial respects from any prior decision.
Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari
20 In a dissenting opinion
in three more peremptory challenge cases.'
Justice Marshall argued that Justice Stevens'
from one of these denials,
"states-as-laboratories ' approach is inappropriate to this issue.' 2 ' He
points out that "in the area of individual rights, state courts have
traditionally looked to the federal judiciary for leadership ... when
this Court has announced a clearly defined, but limited federal
constitutional protection for a particular right, the state supreme courts
."I22 On
have been less willing to develop more generous doctrines ..
federal
the
to
look
simply
courts
state
exclusion,
systematic
of
the issue
goes
inquiry
the
and
law
good
still
is
judiciary, discover that Swain
23 Marshall's concerns seem well founded for, as has been
no further.'
seen, Stevens' invitation has spurred very little response. The vast
majority of states have either failed to act at all or, like Illinois in
Payne, have merely reasserted their adherence to the Swain rule.
Moreover, the few responses to Stevens' suggestion have created
their own difficulties. With McCray, the confusion over the peremptory
challenge issue, once limited to the state courts, has spread to the
federal courts as well. Arguably, federal court involvement will hasten
Supreme Court action on the question, but for now the federal system
118. Id.
119. Id. The Neil court made a rather curious statement in this regard, saying
that "the state no less than a defendant, is entitled to an impartial jury." (Emphasis
added) While this assertion has an undeniable common-sense appeal, it must be noted
that the sixth amendment applies to individuals, not to the states. From a strict constitutional standpoint, the states have no "rights" at all under the sixth amendment.
Nonetheless, the court's position on this point may be explained as a matter
of policy, especially if one refers to recent events in Florida. Peremptory challenges
by the defense have become a controversial topic in Florida, especially in Miami,
where all-white juries had acquitted several police officers charged with killing blacks.
Riots erupted after some of the acquittals. See Nat'l L.J., October 22, 1984, at
30, col. 1.
120. Harris v. Texas, 104 S. Ct. 3556 (1984); Williams v. Illinois, 104 S. Ct.
2364 (1984); Gilliard v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 40 (1983).
121. Gilliard, 104 S. Ct. 40 (1983).
122. Id. at 42.
123. Id. at 44.
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finds itself headed for disarray. Also, if the Supreme Court envisioned any sort of unanimity among the state courts, Neil provides very
little comfort. Indeed, Neil raises more questions than it answers. For
instance, should the state, as well as the defendant, be permitted to
object to the exercise of peremptories? If so, on what constitutional
basis? If not, may defense attorneys representing white defendants
accused of crimes against minority victims use peremptory challenges
to eliminate minority jurors? Should the exclusion issue be limited
to challenges based on race, or is the elimination of any discrete group
objectionable? Wheeler, Thompson and Neil offer three different sets
of answers to these questions. Only the United States Supreme Court
is in a position to provide definitive solutions.
Of all the approaches discussed above, the one employed in
Thompson would seem to be the most palatable to the Court. Thompson limits the right to object to the use of peremptories to challenges
based on race. This narrow application serves to defuse the charge
that if Swain is modified all peremptory challenges will be open to
question. Furthermore, it is a fact that the peremptory challenge
problem has universally arisen in a racial context. Also, Thompson
calls for extreme deference to the initial determination of the trial
court. This posture provides as much latitude as possible for the exercise of challenges because of vague impressions that could not be
gleaned from a cold record. As to whether prosecutors should be permitted to object to the use of peremptories, that is a decision which
is probably best left to the states. There is certainly no constitutional
basis upon which the Supreme Court could issue such a rule.
B.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

One can only speculate as to when, if ever, the Supreme Court
will agree to reconsider the systematic exclusion issue. In lieu of Court
action, various other means of ameliorating the problem have been
proposed.124 Most of these proposals involve some modification of
the statutory peremptory challenge scheme, and hence would require
legislative action.
For example, it has been suggested that all peremptory challenges
be taken away from the prosecution.' 2 5 It is argued that it is the
124. Several of these suggestions are compiled in the Frazier opinion. 127 Ill.
App. 3d at 158-60, 469 N.E.2d at 599-601.
125. Technically, this has been the practice in England since 1305, although as a
practical matter the English standing aside procedure works to the same effect
as
peremptory challenges. See supra note 3 1. See also Frazier, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 159,
469
N.E.2d at 600; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 167.
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prosecutor's duty as an officer of the state to see that the accused

is tried by an impartial jury; it is not his duty to seek the jury most
likely to convict. If, in the name of impartiality, the jury is to repre-

sent every faction of the community, no shade of opinion should be
excluded.12 6 In response to these justifications, it must be noted that

peremptory challenges on both sides have become an established feature
of the American system. The belief is widely held that, between the
defendant and the state, "the scales are to be evenly held",'2"and

such beliefs would die hard.

It has also been proposed that.peremptory challenges should be

eliminated altogether-for both prosecution and defense.' 28 Advocates
of this suggestion argue that if the judicial system is committed to

completely representative juries, it is anomalous to allow either side
29
to remove a juror thought to be unfriendly to its position.' Even
those who support this proposal would continue to permit challenges

for cause, however, based on a realization that it is inevitable that

certain individuals will be so strongly predisposed toward one side

or the other that any jury including such individuals would be inherently unfair. 3 ° Given that reality, challenges for cause alone are
probably inadequate to eliminate biased persons because for such a

challenge to succeed a judge must be convinced of its validity. 3 '
A compromise of sorts has also been proposed, which would
reduce the overall number of peremptories allowed and give the defen-

dant a greater number than the prosecution.' 32 This approach, the
reasoning goes, would enable prosecutors to strike jurors who are
prejudiced against the state's side, but would not provide enough
challenges to systematically exclude whole classes of prospective
jurors.' 33 If legislative restructuring of the peremptory challenge system

is to be the solution to the systematic exclusion problem, this approach

126. J. VAN DYiE, supra note 11, at 167. Van Dyke points out that it would
be less than "revolutionary" to deprive the prosecution of peremptories. The most
populous states during this country's first century, New York and Virginia, did not
allow prosecution's peremptories until 1881 and 1919, respectively.
127. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220, (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1886)).
128. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 167-68.
129. Id. at 168.
130. Id.
131. Id. The source of this problem is the understandable reluctance of people
to admit certain attitudes to themselves, much less in open court. The tendency of
a prospective juror is to give the "right" (i.e. socially acceptable) answers to questions which probe for latent bias against certain groups, be they racial, ethnic or
religious minorities. Id.
132. Id. at 169.
133. Frazier, 127 I11.App. 3d at 159, 469 N.E.2d at 600. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 24(b) provides that in cases involving crimes punishable by more than
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comes the closest to satisfactorily balancing the competing interests
and considerations.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

The Swain approach to the issue of systematic exclusion of minority group members from service on juries needs to be re-evaluated
and modified. The unquestioned importance of peremptories notwithstanding, some action should be taken to adjust the balance
between the legitimate exercise of challenges and the right of defendants to be tried by an impartial jury.
The proposed legislative remedies discussed above suffer from
certain shortcomings. Reduction of the number of peremptories would
merely make systematic exclusion more difficult, not forbidden. If
the practice is deemed improper, the law should command, "Don't
do it", not "Don't do it so often." Complete elimination of peremptories would deprive the state, and perhaps the defendant as well,
of what is recognized as a valuable tool in the adversary system. The
use of peremptory challenges is not at issue; their misuse is.
It is unlikely that the state legislatures will pass unequivocal
measures prohibiting the exercise of peremptories to exclude members
of minority groups. The ultimate solution therefore, rests with the
United States Supreme Court. Its current wait-and-see approach is
not working, for the intended laboratories are either refusing to
cooperate with the experiment at all, or are causing the issue to become
even more confounded. The Court should confront the issue at its
next opportunity. When it does, a single-case, "reasonable inference"
test should be the result.
ROBERT PAUL ARNOLD

one year of imprisonment, the defendant is allowed 10 peremptory challenges to the
government's six.

